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Abstract
The question of how technological change a¤ects labor markets is a classical one in
macroeconomics. A standard framework for addressing this question is the search/matching
model with vintage capital and exogenous technical progress. Within this framework,
it has been argued in the literature that the impact of new technology change on
labor market outcomes can be qualitatively very di¤erent according to the mecha-
nism through which the new technology enters the economy. In particular, it matters
whether: (1) new capital replaces old capital by destroying the job and displacing the
worker (Schumpeterian creative-destruction) or old capital can be “upgraded” to the
frontier technology (Solowian upgrading); (2) …rms make the technology adoption deci-
sion unilaterally (hold-up), or the investment decision is surplus-maximizing (e¢cient
investment). Our main …nding is that, for all parameter values that are quantita-
tively reasonable, the speci…c details of the model for how technology is introduced
and who decides on investments does not matter for the equilibrium outcomes of our
main variables: unemployment, wage inequality, and labor share. The intuition for this
“equivalence result” is that these models will yield signi…cantly di¤erent implications
only if the matching process is very costly and time-consuming, but our calibration
shows that this meeting friction is minor.
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01 Introduction
Technological change is gradual and a large part of technological change is embodied in
capital equipment. New machines tend to be much more productive than older machines, but
not everybody is working with the most advanced equipment. Given that capital-embodied
technical change creates substantial productivity inequality among machines, what are its
e¤ects on the inequality among labor that uses that equipment? Put di¤erently, what is the
economic mechanism linking technical progress to inequality through labor markets?
If we view the labor market as a frictionless environment where workers are paid according
to their marginal product, then the impact of technological change on inequality is limited
to the extent that workers di¤er in their ability to use capital. Jovanovic (1998) showed that
when capital embodies technological progress and machines are indivisible, faster growth
raises wage inequality, as long as skills complement capital: the most skilled workers will be
the ones who are e¢ciently assigned to work on the most productive machines. However,
workers who use di¤erent vintages of capital but are otherwise identical will be paid the
same wage.
On the other hand, if frictions that prevent the free and timeless reallocation of labor
among alternative uses are an essential part of the labor market the situation is more com-
plex. First, wages of workers with the same abilities may now re‡ect the relative productivity
di¤erence of the equipment they are working with. Second, frictions generate another key di-
mension of inequality across workers, namely employment status: since technological change
may require the reallocation of labor, but reallocation requires time, not all workers will be
employed at any time.
The objective of this paper is to analyze quantitatively how technical progress a¤ects
inequality in economies with frictional labor markets. More speci…cally, we study a matching
model à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) with vintage capital à la Solow (1960),
where technological advancement comes through the introduction of new capital goods. The
DMP model over the years has established itself as a standard framework of analysis of
the labor market (see Pissarides 2000 for an overview of the approach). Capital-embodied
technical change is, arguably, the key driving force of productivity growth in developed
economies in the past three decades (e.g., Jorgenson 2001). We maintain, throughout our
analysis, a quantitative-theory focus: we tightly parameterize our model economies in order
1to match some micro-estimates and certain stable, long-run facts. In particular, within our
model we can consistently use data on equipment prices, adjusted for quality, to measure
the speed at which the new equipment investment carries technology improvements.1 Our
statements are therefore mostly quantitative, but we always provide an intuition based on
the mechanisms operating in the model.
The existing literature has been mainly concerned with the qualitative characterization
of how equilibrium unemployment reacts to changes in the speed of technology. Several
distinct approaches emerge from the literature. Aghion and Howitt (1994) argue that when
new and more productive equipment enters the economy exclusively through the creation
of new matches—because existing matches cannot be “upgraded”—it has a Schumpeterian
“creative-destruction” e¤ect: new capital always competes with old capital by making it more
obsolete and tends to destroy existing matches, because workers are better o¤ separating from
their old matches to search for the new …rms endowed with the most productive technology.
Unemployment tends to go up as growth accelerates, due to a higher job-separation rate. The
models of Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Cohen and Saint-Paul (1994) bear similarities
to the Aghion-Howitt approach.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) propose an alternative approach whereby the new tech-
nologies enter into existing …rms through a costly “upgrading” process of old capital. Thus, in
this latter case, but not in the former, one could say that technology is “match-augmenting”,
because it augments the value of existing matches. In the extreme case where upgrading
can proceed at no cost, we have the Solowian model of disembodied technological change,
even though the carrier of technology is equipment. The separation rate is una¤ected by
faster growth and all the e¤ects work through job creation. For small values of the up-
grading cost, unemployment falls with faster growth, thanks to the familiar “capitalization
e¤ect”: investors are encouraged to create more vacancies, knowing that they will be able
to incorporate ( and hence bene…t from) future technological advances.2
The distinction between these two ways in which productivity improvements are intro-
duced into the economy is quite important for inequality: the two forms of technological
1Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), and Cummins and Violante
(2002) provide theoretical justi…cations and implementations of the price-based approach to the measurement
of capital-embodied technical change.
2An interesting quali…cation to this result is provided by King and Welling (1995): if, unlike what is
customarily assumed in this family of models, workers bear the full …xed search cost, then the capitalization
e¤ect leads to an increase in the number of searchers and to longer unemployment durations.
2change have very di¤erent direct e¤ects on the ‡ows into and out of the pools of vacant
and matched …rms, and thus on unemployment. As a consequence, there are also indirect
e¤ects on wage inequality, because unemployment and wage inequality interact when there
are frictions: the unemployment rate is a determinant of the labor share and of wage in-
equality when, as typically assumed, wages are set by Nash bargaining. Conversely, the
unemployment rate depends on the share of output accruing to labor via its e¤ect on …rm
entry (job creation) and on which matches are pro…table to maintain (job destruction).3
Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) argue that the hold-up
problem is pervasive in the labor market and that it in‡uences both unemployment and the
division of output between labor and capital, and thus inequality between the owners of the
two factors (see Grout 1984 for an early theoretical model of hold-up in the labor market).
Within a relationship between two parties, one party is held up if she has to pay the cost,
while they both share the revenues. The new equipment investment potentially poses a
severe hold-up problem. If, as one might assume, the …rm pays for the upgrading/purchase
and becomes the sole owner of the new machine, then because the wage is set ex-post
according to Nash bargaining, the new investment bene…ts the worker too. This “contract
incompleteness” encourages the …rm to underinvest and create fewer jobs, which could hurt
the worker as well: in other words, the …rm-worker joint surplus would not be maximized, and
there would be “money left on the table”. The key question is whether there exist appropriate
contractual arrangements allowing …rms and workers to co-own capital and whether workers
have enough resources to pay …rms for the equipment purchase (e.g., workers may be credit-
constrained) or, as an alternative, whether workers can commit to accept lower future wages.
From this discussion of the literature it is clear that to understand the role of capital-
embodied growth on labor market inequality it becomes necessary to be speci…c about the
way in which the new and more productive capital is introduced into the worker-…rm relation-
ship. The two key dimensions of this “capital replacement” problem in frictional economies
are: (1) Does the new capital entering the economy bene…t only new …rms/activities that
compete with old ones, or rather enhance old ones as well? and (2) Who pays for the
introduction of the new equipment?
3Incidentally, the two approaches have di¤erent implications for employment protection policies: in a
world where the introduction of more productive capital requires a re-organization of production and a …rm-
worker separation, employment-protection policies can have a large impact on average productivity, whereas
in a world where capital can be upgraded without shedding labor, the e¤ects of these policies will be minor.
3In our model, we analyze both dimensions. First, we nest the two ways in which new
equipment can enter—one is match-augmenting and one is not—by assuming that (i) new
entrant …rms can buy new equipment at price I0 and (ii) existing …rms, whether matched
or not, can upgrade their equipment to the latest vintage at price Iu. Thus, if Iu = 0,
technological change is fully match-augmenting and disembodied, whereas if Iu = 1, it has
no match-augmenting or disembodied feature at all. In equilibrium, depending on parameter
values, new equipment may enter through either channel. Second, we study two possible
contractual arrangements for the capital upgrading problem with di¤erent degrees of hold-
up: one where equipment purchases maximize …rm/worker surplus, and one where they only
maximize …rms’ pro…ts but the worker does not share the investment cost, and we examine
to what extent the two models have di¤erent implications for labor market inequalities.
We …nd that the employment e¤ects of a rise in the rate of capital-embodied techno-
logical change are closer to those emphasized by Aghion and Howitt (1994) than by the
match-augmenting view: unemployment rises. The reason is quantitative. Even when the
new equipment enters through upgrading of existing capital, in order to match the data on
the average age of capital, which is quite high, this upgrading cost has to be substantial
enough that the match-embodied aspect of new technology become quantitatively unimpor-
tant. Thus, a model without upgrading—where capital only enters through new …rms—
produces very similar results to one where (quantitatively restricted) upgrading is the main
channel. With respect to the hold-up problem, we …nd again, somewhat surprisingly, that
whether there are hold-up problems or not has a very marginal quantitative impact on any
results. The reason is that, at the point of upgrading, again because of the restriction that
the upgrading cost be quantitatively reasonable, the total surplus in a match is small in
relative terms, so whether or not the worker participates in the decision is not important.
Overall the conclusion of the paper is stark: a properly parameterized (i.e., restricted)
DMP model has the same quantitative implications for the link between capital-embodied
growth and labor market inequalities, independently of the seemingly important details
regarding who bene…ts from (new matches or all matches) and who pays for (workers and
…rms or …rms only) the technological advancement. The intuition for this “equivalence
result” is that upgrading can be a lot better than creative destruction only if it is very costly
for …rms to meet workers, but our calibration shows that this meeting friction is minor.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the vintage-capital
4economy without frictions and characterize the competitive equilibrium. This is a useful
benchmark, since our general matching model converges to the competitive model as the
frictions vanish. In Section 3 we introduce frictions through a standard matching-function
setup. We consider various alternatives for capital replacement: one where replacement
involves the destruction of the match (Schumpeterian model) and two models where it simply
involves upgrading of capital without separation (Solowian model): one where investment
is pairwise-e¢cient and one where the …rm is held up by the worker. In Section 4 we
calibrate the frictional model to the U.S. economy, we draw a quantitative comparison of
the various economies, and we provide an intuitive explanation for the main “equivalence
results”. Section 5 concludes.
2 The frictionless economy
We now present a version of the Solow (1960) frictionless vintage capital model where pro-
duction is decentralized into worker-machine pairs operating Leontief technologies: this de-
centralized production structure is typical in frictional economies. The competitive economy
displays neither wage nor employment inequality, however, it is a useful starting point for our
analysis since it embeds many of the economic forces present in the richer (and more com-
plex) frictional model. In particular, we can see how embodied technical change is re‡ected
in the relative price of equipment capital.
Environment– Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a stationary measure
1 of ex-ante equal, in…nitely lived workers who supply one unit of labor inelastically. The
workers are risk-neutral and discount the future at rate r. Production requires pairing one
machine and one worker. Machines (or jobs, or …rms, or production units) are characterized
by the amount of e¢ciency units of capital k they embody. A matched worker-machine pair
produces a homogeneous output good.
There is embodied and disembodied technical change. The economy-wide disembodied
productivity level z (t) grows at a constant rate Ã > 0. Technological progress is also
embodied in capital and the amount of e¢ciency units embodied in new machines grows at
the rate ° > 0. Once capital is installed in a machine it is subject to physical depreciation
at the rate ± > 0. A machine may also be destroyed, according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate ¾ > 0. A production unit that at time t has age a and is paired with a worker
5has output









where ! > 0. In what follows we set, without loss of generality, z (0) = k(0) = 1:
At any time t …rms can freely enter the market upon payment of the initial installation
cost I0(t) for a machine of vintage t. The cost of new vintages grows at the rate g. Existing
…rms with older machines have the opportunity to upgrade their machine and bring its
productivity up to par with the newest vintage. The cost of upgrading Iu (t;a) ¸ 0 grows
at the rate g but it is independent of age for a · ^ a. We assume that once a machine is too
old, it becomes in…nitely costly to upgrade: Iu (t;a) = 1 for a > ^ a.
Rendering the growth model stationary– We will focus on the steady state of the
normalized economy; this corresponds to a balanced growth path of the actual economy. It is
immediate that for a balanced growth path to exist, we need g = Ã+!°. In order to make the
model stationary we normalize all variables dividing by the growth factor egt. The normalized
cost of a new production unit is then constant at I0 and Iu, and the normalized output of
a production unit of age a which is paired with a worker is e¡Áa, where Á ´ ! (° + ±), thus
output is de…ned relative tothe newestproduction unit. Note thatthe parameter Á represents
the e¤ective depreciation rate of capital obtained as the sum of physical depreciation ± and
technological obsolescence °: In Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2003, Appendix A.1), we
describe the normalization procedure in detail.
Embodied technical change and the relative price of new capital– Since the cost
of new vintage machines in terms of the output good, I0 and Iu, is growing at the rate g
but the number of e¢ciency units embodied in new vintages is growing at the rate °, the
price of quality-adjusted capital (e¢ciency units) in terms of output is changing at the rate
g¡° = Ã¡(1 ¡ !)°. In the quantitative analysis of our model we will use this relationship
to obtain a measure of the rate of embodied technical change from the rate at which the
observed relative price of equipment capital changes.
Competitive equilibrium– Assume that the labor market is frictionless and competi-
tive so that there is a unique market-clearing wage. In the steady state the wage rate w, now
measured relative to the output of the newest vintage, is constant. Consider a price-taker
…rm with the newest vintage machine. The …rm optimally chooses the age ¹ a that maximizes












where ¦(w) is the pro…t function, and r ¡ g + ¾ is the e¤ective discount factor. Since ‡ow
pro…ts are monotonically declining in age and eventually become negative, there is a unique
age at which the machine will be discarded or upgraded. The intuition is that while the
wage w is the same for all …rms, output falls compared to the new machines because of
depreciation and obsolescence. Pro…t maximization leads to the condition
w = e
¡Á¹ a; (2)
stating that the price of labor has to equal the relative productivity of the oldest machine,
which is also the marginal productivity of labor. The higher the wage, the shorter the
life-length of capital since (normalized) pro…ts per period fall and thus reach zero sooner.
Free entry of …rms with new machines or upgrading of existing machines requires that
in equilibrium ¦(w) = I0.4 This is the key condition that determines exit/upgrading age
¹ a, and hence wages. Using the pro…t-maximization condition (2), the optimal investment











It is obvious that in an equilibrium there will always be entry, and there will be upgrading
only if Iu < I0. In other words, there is no interesting trade-o¤ in this model given the
competitive nature of the labor market. It is only with matching frictions that a …rm could,
for example, choose upgrading over “creative-destruction” even if Iu > I0; as it could save
on search costs.5
Existence and uniqueness– Equation (3) allows us to discuss existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium as well as comparative statics.6 The right-hand side of this equilibrium
4There is always a positive in‡ow of new machines since machines fail at a constant rate.
5Note that we could have allowed …rms to replace their capital with machines of any vintage, not just the
frontier technology without any change in the equilibrium conditions: pro…t-maximizing …rms always choose
the newest capital vintage. The key behind this result is that the labor required to operate new machines
is constant over time, which is why new technologies are better: in fact, technological change allows …rms
to pair their worker with more and more e¢ciency units of capital over time by using newer and newer
equipment. A …rm choosing to invest in old capital would, once in operation, generate lower output at the
same wage cost. The lower initial installation cost of the old machine would compensate these losses only
partially. This argument is easy to verify mathematically, so we omit its proof in the text.
6It is straightforward to solve for e¢cient allocations and show that a stationary solution to the planner’s
problem reproduces the competitive allocations (see Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2003, Appendix A.2).
7condition is strictly increasing in the upgrading/exit age ¹ a for two reasons. First, in an
equilibrium with older …rms, the relative productivity of the marginal operating …rm is
lower and therefore wages have to be lower and pro…ts higher. Second, a longer machine
life increases the time-span for which pro…ts are accumulated. De…ne ¹ r ´ r ¡ g + ¾ + Á =
r + ¾ ¡ Ã + !±: The right-hand side of (3) increases from 0 to 1=¹ r as ¹ a goes from 0 to
in…nity. Taken together, these facts mean that there exists a unique steady state exit age
¹ aCE whenever I0 < 1=¹ r. This condition is natural: unless you can recover the initial capital
investment at zero wages using an in…nite lifetime (
R 1
0 e¡¹ rada = 1=¹ r being the net pro…t
from such an operation), it is not pro…table to start any …rm. Finally, with a unit mass of
workers, all employed, the …rm distribution is uniform with density 1=¹ aCE, which is also the
measure of entering/upgrading …rms.
Comparative statics– A larger interest rate r decreases present-value pro…ts, thus
lowering entry and increasing the life span of the machine ¹ a. A higher rate of disembodied
technical change Ã acts just like a reduced interest rate. An increase in the cost of purchasing
a new machine I0 will raise the life span: fewer machines enter and they stay in operation
longer to recover the …xed cost. Conversely, a higher rate of embodied technical change
° lowers the cost of hiring labor because it reduces the relative productivity of the least
productive …rm. Higher pro…ts imply an increase in entry at the expense of older machines
that are forced to exit earlier.7
3 The economies with matching frictions
Consider an economy with same preferences, demographics, and technology, but where the
labor market is frictional in the sense of Pissarides (2000): an aggregate matching function
governs job creation. The nature of the …rm’s decision process remains the same as in the
frictionless economy: there is free entry of …rms which buy a new piece of capital, participate
in the search process, start producing upon matching with a worker, and …nally either
upgrade their capital once it becomes too old or exit if upgrading is too costly. Searching
is costless: it only takes time. Existing matches dissolve exogenously at the rate ¾: upon
dissolution, the worker and the …rm are thrown into the pool of searchers.8
7More formally, the right-hand side of equation (3) is increasing in the growth rate ° since ¹ r is independent
of ° and Á is increasing in °.
8Note that ¾ now only denotes the separation of a machine from a worker, and not the destruction of
the machine as in the frictionless economy. We omitted separations from the description of the competitive
8In this environment vacant …rms are heterogeneous in the vintage of their capital for two
reasons: …rst, newly created …rms do not match instantaneously, so they remain idle until
luck makes them meet a worker; second, …rms hit by exogenous separation will also become
idle. Note here a key di¤erence with the traditional search-matching framework (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1998): the traditional models assume that a new machine can be purchased
at no cost and that only posting a vacancy entails a ‡ow cost. This assumption implies that
the pool of vacancies consists of the newest machines only, and that only matched machines
age over time.9 Our setup is built on the opposite assumption: purchasing and installing
capital is costly—an expense which is sunk when the vacant …rm start searching—whereas
posting a vacancy is costless.10 As a result, it can be optimal even for …rms with old capital
to remain idle.
This class of economic environments is a hybrid between vintage models and matching
models. The traditional assumption emphasizes the matching features of the environment,
while the explicit distinction between a “large” purchase/setup cost for the machine and a
“smaller” search/recruiting ‡ow cost (zero in our model) …ts more naturally with its vintage-
capital aspects, whose emphasis is on capital investment expenditures as a way of improving
productivity. In actual economies, new and old vacancies coexist, as in our setup. Moreover,
in Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2003) we show that the frictionless vintage capital model
is obtained as the limit of our model as frictions vanish, whereas the standard model converges
to an economy with a degenerate vintage structure (i.e. only the newest vintage of capital
is in operation).
3.1 The environment
Random matching– The rate at which a worker meets a …rm with capital of age a is ¸w(a)
and the rate at which she meets any …rm is ¸w ´
R 1
0 ¸w(a)da, where we assume that the
integral is …nite. A …rm meets a worker at the rate ¸f. Let º(a) denote the measure of
vacant …rms with machines of age a. We assume that the number of matches in any moment
equilibrium because, without frictions, it is immaterial whether the match dissolves exogenously or not as
the worker can be replaced instantaneously by the …rm at no cost.
9Aghion and Howitt (1994) also describe a vintage capital model with initial setup costs for capital, but
they assume that matching is “deterministic”: at the time a new machine is set up, a worker queues up for
the machine, and after a …xed amount of time the worker and …rm start operations. Hence, in the matching
process, all vacant …rms are equal (although they do not embody the leading-edge technology).
10Vacancy heterogeneity will survive the addition of a ‡ow search cost, as long as this cost is strictly less
than the initial set-up cost I0.
9is determined by a constant returns to scale matching function m(v;u), where v ´
R 1
0 º(a)da
is the total number of vacancies and u is the total number of unemployed workers. We also
assume that m(v;u) is strictly increasing in both arguments and satis…es some standard










The expression for the meeting probability in (4) provides a one-to-one (strictly decreasing)
mapping between ¸f and µ. Thereafter, when we discuss changes in ¸f, we imagine changes
in µ. The measure of worker-…rm matches with an a machine is denoted ¹(a) and total
employment ¹.
Scrapping versus upgrading– Values for the market participants are J(a) and W(a)
for matched …rms and workers, respectively, V (a) for vacant …rms, and U for unemployed
workers. We consider two forms of capital replacement and the value functions will di¤er in
the two cases. First, we study an economy where replacement takes place through creative
destruction: the nature of the …rm’s decision process is such that it buys a piece of capital
at cost I0, then matches with a worker, and exits the economy once the machine reaches
the optimal scrapping age ¹ a. Scrapping implies the destruction of the match. Second, we
introduce the option that a …rm may upgrade its machine anytime it would like to at the
upgrading cost Iu, without separation from the worker. The optimal replacement age is also
denoted ¹ a. Due to the exogenous separations and the matching frictions, some …rms will
also be vacant. It is immediate to see that vacant machines do not upgrade until they are
matched with a worker, and they exit once upgrading becomes impossible, which occurs at
the exogenous age a = ^ a. Replacing capital before meeting a worker is sub-optimal as the
machine would get obsolete without being used productively.
11In particular,









10The values of matched workers and …rms– Under both replacement models, the
‡ow value of a job for …rm and worker for a · ¹ a is given respectively by
(r ¡ g)J(a) = maxfe
¡Áa ¡ w(a) ¡ ¾ [J(a) ¡ V (a)] + J
0(a);(r ¡ g)V (a)g (6)
(r ¡ g)W(a) = maxfw(a) ¡ ¾[W(a) ¡ U] + W
0(a);(r ¡ g)Ug (7)
The return of a matched …rm with an age a machine is equal to pro…t, i.e., production less
wages w(a) paid to the worker, minus the ‡ow rate of capital losses from separation plus
the ‡ow losses/gains due to the aging of machines.12 Analogously for a worker, the return
on being in a match with an age a machine is the wage minus the ‡ow rate of capital losses
from separation plus the ‡ow losses/gains due to the aging of machines. For the match to
be maintained the ‡ow return from staying in the match must be at least as high as the ‡ow
return from leaving the match, i.e., from the …rm becoming vacant and the worker becoming
unemployed. Note that the capital value equations for matched workers and …rms are de…ned
only for matches with machines not older than ¹ a, since all machines are either scrapped or
upgraded at age ¹ a.
Wage determination– In the presence of frictions, a bilateral monopoly problem be-
tween the …rm and the worker arises and, thus, wages are not competitive. As is standard
in the literature, we choose a cooperative Nash bargaining solution for wages. In particular,
we assume that the parameter de…ning the relative bargaining power is the same when the
pair negotiates over how to split output and over how to share the upgrading cost Iu in case
of joint maximization. With outside options as in the above equations, the wage is such that
at every instant a fraction ¯ of the total surplus S (a) ´ J (a)+W (a)¡V (a)¡U of a type
a match goes to the worker and a fraction (1 ¡ ¯) goes to the …rm:
W(a) = U + ¯S (a) and J(a) = V (a) + (1 ¡ ¯)S (a): (8)
Using the surplus-based de…nition (8) of the value of an employed worker W(a) in equa-
tion (7) and rearranging terms, we obtain the wage rate as
w(a) = (r ¡ g)U + ¯ [(r ¡ g + ¾)S (a) ¡ S
0 (a)]: (9)
12In Appendix A.2 we describe a typical derivation of the di¤erential equations above.
11The values of vacant workers and …rms– In the model with creative destruction,
the values of idle workers and …rms are
(r ¡ g)V (a) = maxf¸f [J(a) ¡ V (a)] + V
0(a);0g (10)
(r ¡ g)U = b +
Z ¹ a
0
¸w(a)[W(a) ¡ U]da (11)
The return on a vacant …rm is equal to the capital gain rate from meeting a worker plus
the ‡ow losses/gains due to the aging of capital. Vacant machines that are older than the
critical age ¹ a exit. The return for unemployed workers is equal to their bene…ts b plus the
capital gain rate from meeting vacant …rms.
Finally, in the model with upgrading, the values of idle workers and …rms are














for ¹ a < a · ^ a
(12)
(r ¡ g)U = b +
Z ¹ a
0







u (a) ¡ U
i
da: (13)
The return on a vacant …rm now di¤ers if the idle machine is older than ¹ a: Vacant machines
that are older than the critical age ¹ a do not exit, but wait until they meet a worker and then
upgrade. At the time the machine is upgraded, the …rm pays its share of the upgrading cost
IJ
u (a). When age ^ a is reached, upgrading becomes in…nitely costly, so the …rm exits. The
return for unemployed workers contains an additional term that gives the value of meeting
vacant machines older than ¹ a: These …rms will upgrade upon meeting a worker, and the
worker contributes IW
u (a) to the upgrading cost and starts working with brand new capital.
Replacement decision– When new capital enters the economy through new …rms,
these …rms are not matched yet, so it is natural to assume that they make unilaterally
the entry/adoption decision. When new technologies enter through upgrading in existing
matches, there are two alternatives. First we view upgrading as a joint maximization problem
and we assume that both …rms and workers contribute to the cost of upgrading Iu. The
relative contributions are such that …rms of age a and workers split the gain from upgrading
G(a) ´ J (0) + W (0) ¡ Iu ¡ J (a) ¡ W (a); (14)
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u (a) + IW
u (a) = Iu
The upgrading cost is then distributed according to
I
W
u (a) = [W (0) ¡ W (a)] ¡ ¯G(a); (15)
I
J
u (a) = [J (0) ¡ J (a)] ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)G(a);
and we can de…ne the gains from upgrading for …rm and worker as
GW (a) = ¯G(a) and GJ (a) = (1 ¡ ¯)G(a): (16)
Alternatively, we assume that the …rm makes the upgrading decision unilaterally, the worker
in a match does not contribute to the upgrading investment and that wages cannot be preset
before the upgrading investment is undertaken. The gains from upgrading are then
GW (a) = W (0) ¡ W (a) and GJ (a) = J (0) ¡ Iu ¡ J (a) (17)
and the upgrading cost shares become IW
u (a) = 0 and IJ
u (a) = Iu.
3.2 The stationary equilibrium
We characterize the equilibrium of the matching model in terms of two variables: the age at
which a …rm exits the market or upgrades its machine and the rate at which vacant …rms
meet workers: (¹ a;¸f). The two variables are jointly determined by two key conditions. The
…rst condition is labelled the job destruction or job upgrading condition. In the economy with
creative destruction (upgrading) this condition expresses the indi¤erence between carrying
on and scrapping (upgrading) the machine for a match with capital of age ¹ a. The second
condition, labelled the job creation condition, expresses the indi¤erence for outside …rms
between creating a vacancy with the newest vintage and not entering. This characterization
is conditional on the steady state employment and vacancy distributions. In Section 3.2.4
we show how these distributions can be characterized in terms of the two unknowns (¹ a;¸f).
133.2.1 The economy with creative destruction
The surplus function– It is useful to start by stating the (‡ow version of the) surplus
equation. Using the de…nition of the surplus S (a) we arrive at
(r ¡ g)S(a) = maxfe
¡Áa ¡ ¾S(a) ¡ ¸f(1 ¡ ¯)S(a) ¡ (r ¡ g)U + S
0(a);0g: (18)
This asset-pricing-like equation is obtained by combining equations (6), (7), (8), and (10):
the growth-adjusted return on surplus on the left-hand side equals the ‡ow gain on the
right-hand side, where the ‡ow gain is the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between total
inside minus total outside ‡ow values. The inside value includes: a production ‡ow e¡Áa, a
‡ow loss due to the probability of a separation of the match ¾S(a), and changes in the value
for the matched parties, J0(a) + W 0(a). The outside option ‡ows are: the ‡ow gain from
the chance that a vacant …rm matches ¸f(1¡¯)S(a), the change in the value for the vacant
…rm V 0(a), and the ‡ow value of unemployment (r ¡ g)U. Note a key di¤erence with the
traditional model: the value of a vacancy is positive, and it contributes towards a reduction
of the rents created by the match.








¡Á~ a ¡ (r ¡ g)U
i
d~ a: (19)
We have used the boundary condition associated with the fact that the surplus-maximizing
decision is to keep the match alive until an age ¹ a when there is no longer any surplus to the
match, S (¹ a) = 0, and there is no gain from a marginal delay of the separation, S0(¹ a) = 0.
For lower a’s the match will have strictly positive surplus, and for values of a above ¹ a the
surplus will be equal to zero.13 Intuitively, the surplus is decreasing in age a for two reasons:
…rst, the time-horizon over which the ‡ow surplus accrues to the pair shortens with a; second,
the value of a job’s output declines with age relative to that of the new vacant jobs.
Equation (19) contains a non-standard term associated with the non-degenerate distrib-
ution of vacancies: the non-zero …rm’s outside option of remaining vacant with its machine
reduces the surplus by increasing the “e¤ective” discount rater through the term (1 ¡ ¯)¸f.
Everything else being equal, the quasi-rents in the match are decreasing as the bargaining
power of the idle …rm or its meeting rate is increasing.
13Straightforward integration of the right-hand side in (19) and further di¤erentiation shows that, over the
range [0;¹ a), the function S(a) is strictly decreasing and convex; moreover, S(a) will approach 0 for a ! ¹ a.
14The job-destruction condition– The optimal separation rule S0 (¹ a) = 0 together with
equation (19) implies that the exit age ¹ a satis…es
e
¡Á¹ a = (r ¡ g)U; (20)
for a given value of unemployment U. The left hand side of (20) is the output of the oldest
match in operation, whereas the right hand side is the ‡ow-value of an idle worker. The
idea is simple: …rms with old enough capital shut down because workers have become too
expensive, since the average productivity of vacancies and, therefore, the workers’ outside
option of searching, is growing at a constant rate. Note that this equation resembles the
pro…t-maximization condition in the frictionless economy, with the worker’s ‡ow outside
option, (r ¡ g)U, playing the role of the competitive wage rate.14
We can now rewrite the surplus function (19) in terms of the two endogenous variables












In this equation, and occasionally below, we use a notation of values (the surplus in this
case) that shows an explicit dependence of ¹ a and ¸f. From (21) it is immediately clear that
S(a;¹ a;¸f) is strictly increasing in ¹ a and decreasing in ¸f. A longer life-span of capital ¹ a
increases the surplus at each age because it lowers the ‡ow value of the worker’s outside
option, as evident from (20). A higher rate at which …rms, when idle, meet workers reduces
the surplus because it increases the outside option for a …rm and shrinks the rents accruing
to the matched pair.
Using (11) and (8) we obtain the optimal separation (or job destruction) condition
e
¡Á¹ a = b + ¯
Z ¹ a
0
¸w(a;¹ a;¸f)S(a;¹ a;¸f)da; (JD)
which is an equation in the two unknowns (¹ a;¸f). The rates ¸w (a) at which unemployed
workers are matched with …rms also depend on the two endogenous variables.
The job-creation condition– We de…ne the value of a vacancy of age a using the
new expression (21) for the surplus of a match S(a;¹ a;¸f) together with (8). The di¤erential
equation for a vacant …rm (10) then implies that the net-present-value of a vacant …rm equals




¡(r¡g)(~ a¡a)S (~ a;¹ a;¸f)d~ a; (22)
14In fact, from the wage equation (9) it follows that the lowest wage paid in the economy (on machines of
age a) exactly equals the ‡ow value of unemployment.
15where ¹ a equals the age at which the vacant …rm exits. Since vacant …rms do not incur in any
direct search cost, they will exit the market at an age such that this expression equals zero,
from which it follows immediately that they will exit at the same age ¹ a at which matched
capital get destroyed and replaced by new …rms. Since in equilibrium there are no pro…ts
from entry, we must have that V (0;¹ a;¸f) = I0, and we thus have the free-entry (or job
creation) condition





This condition requires that the cost of creating a new job I0 equals the value of a vacant …rm
at age zero, which is the expected present value of the pro…ts it will generate: a share (1 ¡ ¯)
of the discounted future surpluses produced by a match occurring at the instantaneous rate
¸f. The job creation condition is the second equation in the two unknowns (¹ a;¸f).
In Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2003) we demonstrate that a solution to the two
equations (JC) and (JD) in the pair (¹ a;¸f) exists and is unique, under very general con-
ditions: in particular, the (JC) condition traces a strictly decreasing curve in the (¹ a;¸f)
space, whereas the (JD) condition traces a strictly increasing relationship.
3.2.2 The economy with upgrading and joint decision making
We now consider an economy where the …rm and worker jointly decide on when the machine
should be upgraded and both parties share in the cost of the project.
Optimal upgrading–A worker-…rm pair will not upgrade its machine as long as the
gains from upgrading are negative. The match values, being the discounted expected present
values of future returns, are continuous functions of the age. Since upgrading is instanta-
neous, at the time a machine is upgraded the gain from upgrading is then zero:
G(¹ a) = J (0) + W (0) ¡ Iu ¡ J (¹ a) ¡ W (¹ a) = 0: (23)
At the optimal upgrading age not only is the gain from upgrading zero, but so is the marginal
gain from a delay of the upgrading decision. This means that at the upgrading age the
derivative of the gain function is zero, that is J0 (¹ a)+W0 (¹ a) = 0. We can use this condition
when we add the value function de…nitions of matched workers, (7), and …rms, (6),
(r ¡ g)[J (¹ a) + W (¹ a)] = e
¡Á¹ a ¡ ¾[J (¹ a) + W (¹ a) ¡ V (¹ a) ¡ U] + J
0 (¹ a) + W
0 (¹ a):
16Together the two no-gains conditions then imply
(r ¡ g)[J (0) + W (0) ¡ Iu] = e
¡Á¹ a ¡ ¾ [J (0) + W (0) ¡ Iu ¡ V (¹ a) ¡ U]. (24)
This condition states that at the optimal upgrading age ¹ a the …rm-worker pair is indi¤erent
between an upgrade and a marginal delay of the upgrade. The left-hand side of this expres-
sion gives the return on an upgraded machine at ¹ a for the matched pair, and the right-hand
side is the ‡ow return from a marginal delay of the upgrading decision: the production ‡ow
minus the surplus capital loss from delay due to separation.15
Optimal upgrading depends on the value of a vacancy at the upgrading age, which in
turn depends on the expected present value of a vacant …rm’s gain from upgrading upon
meeting a worker (12). From the rule (15) which determines how the gains from upgrading
(14) are shared we get
J(0) ¡ I
J
u (a) ¡ V (a) = (1 ¡ ¯)[S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu ¡ V (a)];
where we have used the free-entry condition V (0) = I0. Substituting this expression in the
de…nition of the value of a vacancy (12) for ¹ a · a · ^ a, collecting terms, and solving the
di¤erential equation subject to the terminal condition V (^ a) = 0, we obtain an expression
for the vacancy value for a ¸ ¹ a
V (a) = ·V J (a;¸f)[S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]; (25)




1 ¡ e¡½V (^ a¡a)
i
and ½V J = (1 ¡ ¯)¸f + r ¡ g. In an equilibrium
the value of a vacancy is non-negative at the upgrading age.
The surplus and the vacancy value at the upgrading age and the surplus and vacancy
value for a …rm with a new machine di¤er only through the cost of upgrading. To see this
use the surplus sharing rule (8) and the free-entry condition in the no-gains condition (23)
and we get
S (¹ a) + V (¹ a) = S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu. (26)
This means that the surplus at the upgrading age is given by
S (¹ a) = [1 ¡ ·V J (¹ a;¸f)][S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]: (27)
15In Appendix A.2 we provide a heuristic derivation of this indi¤erence condition based on the limit of
discrete time approximations.
17In an equilibrium, both the surplus and vacancy value at the upgrading age are non-negative.
Note that in the economy with upgrading the surplus and vacancy value at the upgrading
age can be strictly positive, as opposed to the creative destruction economy where machines
are scrapped at the exit age because the surplus of the match is zero. Since ·V J 2 (0;1)
either the surplus and vacancy value are both zero or both strictly positive.
In the de…nition of the job-upgrading and job-creation conditions below we use the surplus
function S (a;¹ a;¸f), de…ned for machines which have not yet reached the upgrading age,
0 · a · ¹ a. In Appendix A.3 we show that we can write the surplus as a function of the
upgrading age and the worker meeting rate only. As a …rst step towards that result we derive
an expression for the surplus value of a new machine as a function of (¹ a;¸f) only, S (0;¹ a;¸f).
The job-upgrading condition– From the condition for the optimal delay of upgrading
(24), together with the expression for the vacancy value at the threshold age ¹ a (25) and the
surplus de…nitions (8), it is easy to derive that
e
¡Á¹ a ¡ ·JJ (¹ a;¸f)[S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu] = (r ¡ g)U; (28)
with ·JJ (¹ a;¸f) = r + g + ¾[1 ¡ ·V J (¹ a;¸f)]. Now consider the ‡ow value of unemployment
(13). Using the surplus sharing rules (8) in the …rst integral term and the upgrading cost
sharing rule (15) in the second integral term of the RHS, and substituting the expression
(28) above for the ‡ow return on unemployment on the LHS, we obtain an expression for
the job upgrading condition entirely as a function of (¹ a;¸f) :
e
¡Á¹ a = b + ¯
Z ¹ a
0
¸w(a;¹ a;¸f)S(a;¹ a;¸f)da (JU-j)
+
(
·JJ (¹ a;¸f) + ¯
Z ^ a
¹ a
¸w(a;¹ a;¸f)[1 ¡ ·V J (a;¸f)]da
)
[S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu]
Comparing this equation with the job destruction condition in the economy with creative
destruction (JD), we note an additional term, always positive, implying that the upgrading
age ¹ a is lower than the destruction age –how much lower depends on the size of the extra term.
Note however that the expression for the surplus function S(a;¹ a;¸f) and the distributions
¸w(a;¹ a;¸f) are not the same in the two economies.16
The job-creation condition– The condition that ensures zero pro…ts at entry is always
I0 = V (0;¹ a;¸f) but we now have a di¤erent expression for the value of a vacant job. From
16We discuss the invariant distributions below, in section 3.2.4, and as noted above we derive the expression
for the surplus in Appendix A.3.
18(12) and (8), it is easy to see that for a · ¹ a




¡(r¡g)(~ a¡a)S (~ a;¹ a;¸f)d~ a + e
¡(r¡g)(¹ a¡a)V (¹ a;¹ a;¸f):
Since the cost of upgrading a machine is independent of the age as long as the machine is
not too old, a · ^ a, vacant machines older than ¹ a will be upgraded. Vacant machines at the
upgrading age ¹ a therefore tend to have positive value as opposed to vacant machines at the
exit age in a creative destruction economy. We can substitute (25) for the vacancy value at
¹ a and obtain the job-creation equilibrium condition, as a function of the pair of unknowns
(¹ a;¸f) only




¡(r¡g)aS (~ a;¹ a;¸f)da + e
¡(r¡g)¹ a·V J (¹ a;¸f)[S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu]: (JC-j)
3.2.3 The economy with upgrading and …rm decision
We now consider the case where …rms unilaterally decide whether a machine should be
upgraded, and the worker does not contribute to the cost of upgrading the machine. This
structure introduces a hold-up problem to the investment decision: ex-ante the worker cannot
share in the investment cost even though it is in the worker’s interest that the project is
undertaken, and ex-post the …rm cannot commit to a future wage path that is contingent on
the upgrading decision. Relative to the joint upgrading decision, machines are thus upgraded
too late.
Optimal upgrading– A …rm will postpone upgrading if its own gain from upgrading is
negative, and a machine is upgraded the moment the gain to the …rm is zero
GJ (¹ a) = J (0) ¡ Iu ¡ J (¹ a) = 0: (29)
Note that from the point of view of the total match value upgrading occurs too late. Since
the gain to a worker when the …rm upgrades the machine is strictly positive, the worker
would be willing to pay the …rm to upgrade the machine earlier.
For ¹ a to be optimal the …rm also has to be indi¤erent between upgrading now and a
marginal delay of the decision, that is G0
J (¹ a) = ¡J0 (¹ a) = 0. We use both no-gain conditions
in the di¤erential equation for a matched …rm’s value and obtain
(r ¡ g)[J (0) ¡ Iu] = e
¡Á¹ a ¡ w(¹ a) ¡ ¾ [J (0) ¡ Iu ¡ V (¹ a)]: (30)
19The left-hand side of this expression is the return on an upgraded machine at ¹ a for a …rm,
and the right-hand side is the ‡ow return from a marginal delay of the upgrading decision:
the pro…t ‡ow, i.e., production minus wage payments, minus the capital loss from delay due
to the possibility of separation.17 This condition on the optimal marginal delay of upgrading
depends on the wage that the …rm has to pay. We now use the wage equation (9) and
the di¤erential equation for the surplus value (18) to express the optimality condition with
respect to the …rm value and unemployment value only.18 After rearranging terms we obtain
(r ¡ g)[J (0) ¡ Iu] = (1 ¡ ¯)
h
e
¡Á¹ a ¡ (r ¡ g)U + ¯¸fS (¹ a)
i
¡ ¾[J (0) ¡ Iu ¡ V (¹ a)]: (31)
which corresponds to equation (24) for the case of joint upgrading.
Optimal upgrading depends on the value of a vacancy at the upgrading age, which in
turn depends on the expected present value of a vacant …rm’s gain from upgrading upon
meeting a worker (12). Since the …rm pays for upgrading, IJ
u = Iu, we can easily solve
the di¤erential equation for the vacancy value (12) for ¹ a · a · ^ a, subject to the terminal
condition V (^ a) = 0,
V (a) = ·V F (a;¸f)[(1 ¡ ¯)S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]; (32)




1 ¡ e¡½V H(^ a¡a)
i
and ½V F = ¸f + r ¡ g. We have used the free entry
condition to substitute for V (0), and the surplus sharing rule (8) to substitute for J (0).
In the economy where the …rm makes the upgrading decision, the sum of a …rm’s vacancy
value and its surplus share when the …rm has a new machine as opposed to a machine at the
upgrading age di¤er only through the upgrading cost. To see this use the surplus sharing
rule (8) in the no-gains condition (29) and we get
(1 ¡ ¯)S (¹ a) + V (¹ a) = (1 ¡ ¯)S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu: (33)
This means that the surplus at the upgrading age is given by
S (¹ a) = [1 ¡ ·V F (¹ a;¸f)][(1 ¡ ¯)S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]: (34)
In Appendix A.3 we derive the surplus value on the interval [0;¹ a] as a function of the
upgrading age and the worker meeting rate only (¹ a;¸f).
17In Appendix A.2 we provide a heuristic derivation of this indi¤erence condition based on the limit of
discrete time approximations.
18Note that the de…nition of the surplus equation is the same for the economies with creative destruction
and with upgrading.
20The job-upgrading condition– We can further simplify the condition for the optimal
delay of upgrading (31) by substituting expression (32) for the vacancy value at the threshold
age ¹ a, and by using the surplus de…nition (8) for the …rm value:
e
¡Á¹ a ¡ ·JF (¹ a;¸f)[(1 ¡ ¯)S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu] = (r ¡ g)U; (35)
with ·JF (¹ a;¸f) = fr + g + [1 ¡ ·V F (¹ a;¸f)](¾ ¡ ¯¸f)g=(1 ¡ ¯). Now consider the ‡ow
value of unemployment (13). Using the surplus sharing rules (8) in the integral terms and
substituting the expression (28) above for the ‡ow return on unemployment on the LHS, we
obtain an expression for the job-upgrading condition entirely as a function of (¹ a;¸f):
e
¡Á¹ a = b +
Z ¹ a
0




+·JF (¹ a;¸f)[(1 ¡ ¯)S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu]
Again, relative to the job-destruction condition in the economy with creative destruction
(JD), we note an additional term, always positive, implying that the upgrading age ¹ a is
lower than the destruction age.19
The job-creation condition– Similar to the previous cases this condition ensures zero
pro…ts at entry is always I0 = V (0;¹ a;¸f). Again we solve the di¤erential equation (12) on
the interval [0;¹ a], but for the terminal condition we use expression (32) for the vacancy value
at the upgrading age:




¡(r¡g)aS (~ a;¹ a;¸f)da (JC-f)
+e
¡(r¡g)¹ a·V F (¹ a;¸f)[(1 ¡ ¯)S (0;¹ a;¸f) + I0 ¡ Iu]:
3.2.4 Invariant employment and vacancy distributions
The economy with creative destruction– We now complete the characterization of the
equilibrium in the economy with creative destruction and derive explicit expressions for the
matching probabilities in terms of the endogenous variables (¹ a;¸f). For this purpose we need
to characterize the stationary vacancy and employment distribution of …rms. Denote with
¹(a) the measure of matches between an a …rm and a worker, and denote total employment
with ¹.20
19Note however that the expression for the surplus function S(a;¹ a;¸f) and the distributions ¸w(a;¹ a;¸f)
are not the same in the two economies. We discuss the invariant distributions below, in section 3.2.4, and
as noted above we derive the expression for the surplus in Appendix A.3.
20In Appendix A.3 we derive the di¤erential equations which characterize the stationary employment
dynamics, equations (36) and (37) below, and solve for the stationary measures, (40) and (41).
21The in‡ow of new …rms is v(0): new …rms acquire the new capital and proceed to the
vacancy pool. Thereafter, these …rms transit stochastically back and forth between vacancy
and match: …rms are matched with workers at rate ¸f and they become vacant at rate ¾.
Finally …rms exit at a = ¹ a, whether vacant or matched. The evolution of employment and
vacancies in a stationary distribution is then determined by the di¤erential equations
v
0 (a) = ¾¹(a) ¡ ¸fv(a), for 0 · a · ¹ a (36)
¹
0 (a) = ¸fv(a) ¡ ¾¹(a), for 0 · a · ¹ a. (37)
The evolution of matched machines is the mirror image of the evolution of vacancies, i.e.
¹0 (a) = ¡v0 (a). This implies that the number of vacant and matched machines of age a less
than ¹ a remains constant:
v (a) + ¹(a) = v (0) + ¹(0), for 0 · a · ¹ a. (38)
Because all …rms proceed …rst to the search pool with their new machines ¹(0) = 0. For
a 2 [0;¹ a), the evolution of ¹(a) therefore follows
¹
0(a) = ¡¾¹(a) + ¸fv(a) = ¸fv(0) ¡ (¾ + ¸f)¹(a): (39)





¹ a ¡ 1








¾+¸f(1 ¡ e¡(¾+¸f)¹ a)
: (41)
The employment (vacancy) density is therefore increasing and concave (decreasing and con-
vex) in age a. The reason for this is that for every age a 2 [0;¹ a) there is a constant number of
machines, and older machines have a larger cumulative probability of having been matched
in the past. This feature distinguishes our model from standard-search vintage models where
the distribution of vacant jobs is degenerate at zero and the employment density is decreasing
in age a at a rate equal to the exogenous destruction rate ¾.
With the vacancy distribution in hand, we now have the explicit expression for the value
of ¸w(a),







¾+¸f(1 ¡ e¡(¾+¸f)¹ a)
; (42)
22which depends only on the pair of endogenous variables (¹ a;¸f), given the strictly decreasing
relation between µ and ¸f, equation (4).
The economy with upgrading– In the economy with upgrading, the key di¤erence is
that after the machine of a …rm reaches age ¹ a the …rm does not exit, but it upgrades the
machine if it is matched to a worker and thereby resets the age to 0. Only vacant …rms that
do not meet a worker by age ^ a exit the economy. For …rms with relatively young machines,
i.e., …rms which do not upgrade their machines, the evolution of employment and vacancies
in a stationary distribution continues to be determined by the di¤erential equations (37),
(36), and equation (38). With the possibility of instantaneous upgrading of machines at age
¹ a and ongoing upgrading of vacant machines with age a ¸ ¹ a, there is however now a strictly
positive employment density of new machines




This means that in the economy with upgrading the employment density is maximal for the
newest vintage – it receives the machines which have just upgraded in addition to all vintages
which immediately upgrade upon meeting a worker – whereas in the economy with creative
destruction the employment density is minimal for new machines. Finally, the evolution of
vacancies that are older than the upgrading age is given by
v
0 (a) = ¡¸fv(a), for ¹ a < a · ^ a (44)
Since matched machines never reach age a > ¹ a there are no exogenous separations. Once
the machine of a vacant …rm reaches age ^ a, upgrading becomes infeasible and the …rm exits.
In Appendix A.5 we show how to solve the system of equations (36), (37), (38), (43), and
(44) for the employment and vacancy distribution, ¹(a) and v(a), conditional on the pair
(¹ a;¸f). With the vacancy distribution in hand, we use (5) to obtain ¸w (a), i.e., the rate at
which workers meet vacant …rms.
4 The quantitative analysis
In the previous sections, we have outlined three di¤erent economies that capture some key
aspects of the process through which innovations and productivity improvements are intro-
duced into the economy: 1) creative-destruction, 2) (pairwise) e¢cient upgrading, and 3)
upgrading with hold-up.
23We want to know if distinguishing among these particular mechanisms has quantitatively
important implications for labor market inequality. We do it in a number of ways. First,
for each economy we target a common set of steady-state aggregate variables and verify
whether the implied parametrization is very di¤erent. Second, we reverse the exercise: we
…x the parametrization and we verify if the implications for some key equilibrium variables
are signi…cantly di¤erent. Third, we study the response of the labor market variables of
interest in each of the three economies to an empirically plausible increase of 1) the rate of
disembodied technical change, and 2) the rate of embodied technical change.
4.1 Common steady-state targets
Overall, we have 13 parameters to calibrate: (r;A;®;¾;¯;±;I0;Iu;^ a;Ã;!;°;b). In the cali-
bration procedure, we aim to match the same set of aggregate U.S. variables across the three
model economies. Below we explain our calibration strategy.
Parameters calibrated “externally”– We set r to match an annual interest rate of
4%. We normalize the scale parameter A of the matching function to 1 and we set the
matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, ®, to 0:5, an average of the values reported in
the comprehensive survey of empirical estimates of matching functions by Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001, Table 3).
Parameters calibrated “internally” – We simultaneously calibrate (¾;¯;±;I0;Iu;^ a)
so that the steady state of each model economy generates (1) an unemployment rate of 4%
(the U.S. historical average); (2) a labor income share of 0:685 (Cooley and Prescott (1995));
(3) a maximal age of capital of 23 years, which corresponds to an average age of capital of
about 11:5 years, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002); and (4) an average
unemployment duration of approximately 8–9 weeks, as reported by Abrahams and Shimer
(2001). The unemployment rate together with the average unemployment duration imply
an annual separation rate for workers from employment to unemployment of 21%, which is
in line with the data reported in CEPR (1995, page 10).21
21In an economy with upgrading the separation rate, i.e.,the unconditional probability that a worker
separates from a job within a period of length ¢, is 1 ¡ exp(¡¾¢). In an economy witout upgrading the








=¹ for the economy. Note that
it would be incorrect to match this variable to job destruction rates (i.e., job ‡ows rather than worker ‡ows,
as we do) since the event occurring at rate ¾ involves only a separation of workers and machines, but not
the destruction of the job.
24Technical change– We have two sources of growth in the model: disembodied produc-
tivity change, occurring at rate Ã, and capital-embodied productivity change. Hornstein and
Krusell (1996) measured annual disembodied growth in the U.S. for 1954–1993 to be 0:8%
per year, whereas more recently Cummins and Violante (2002) compute it to be 0:3% per
year from 1965–2000. We set Ã = 0:5%. At least since Greenwood et al. (1997), a number
of authors have suggested to measure the speed of embodied technical change through the
(inverse of the) rate of decline of the quality-adjusted relative price of capital. In section 2
we have argued that in our environment embodied technical change is directly re‡ected in
the rate at which the relative price of new capital declines, °¡g. Gordon’s (1990) in‡uential
work on quality-adjusted prices for durable goods suggests a value for the annual rate of
embodied technical change in the U.S. around 3%. Given the observed average U.S. output
growth rate g = 2%, a 3% rate of price decline for capital implies that ° = 5%: From the
relation g ¡ ° = Ã ¡ (1 ¡ !)°, we obtain a capital elasticity parameter ! = 0:3.
Institutions– The parameter b is supposed to summarize a wide range of bene…t policies
that vary with unemployment duration and family status (none of which we model). The
OECD Employment Outlook (1996) provides replacement rates for unemployment bene…ts
in OECD countries from 1961 to 1995 for two earnings levels, three family types, and three
durations of unemployment. The reported average replacement rate for the United States in
that period was 10% and we choose b to replicate this number.
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1 below. A clear conclusion emerges: if
we take the distance between parameters as a measure of closeness of the three economies,
then it appears that the three economies are remarkably similar: very small parametric
di¤erences are needed to match the same set of facts.
25Table 1. Common steady-state targets
Common parameters
r = 0:04;A = 1; ® = 0:5;
Ã = 0:005;° = 0:05; ! = 0:3
Model speci…c parameters
Economy with Economy without
upgrading investment upgrading investment
Joint surplus max Firm value max
± 0.060 0.064 0.641
¾ 0.238 0.251 0.210
¯ 0.670 0.662 0.609
b 0.048 0.047 0.047
I0 4.537 4.308 4.165
Iu 4.182 4.093 NA
^ a 28.00 28.00 NA
4.2 Common parametrization
We now reverse the logic of the previous exercise and we …x the parametrization across the
three economies, using the calibration of the economy with e¢cient (joint-surplus maximiz-
ing) upgrading decision. Given this set of parameter values we have then calculated the
steady state when the …rm decides on upgrading in order to maximize its own value and
when there is no upgrading. The results are in Table 2 below.
Given that machines can be upgraded, the nature of the upgrading decision is not very
important for the outcome: the numbers in the …rst and second column of Table 2 are es-
sentially the same.22 The “creative destruction” feature of the economy without upgrading
(third column) comes through in a slightly higher separation rate and unemployment du-
ration, leading to a rate of unemployment 1:1% larger. If machines cannot be upgraded,
relatively old matches will be destroyed for sure, which also results in a somewhat smaller
job creation rate (and unemployment duration). At this higher unemployment rate, however
both wage inequality and the labor share are essentially the same for the economies with
and without upgrading. Overall, the di¤erence in the key measures of equilibrium labor
market inequalities between the economies with and without upgrading does not appear to
be quantitatively very important.
22Notice also that in the calibrated economy with upgrading for all practical purposes there is no entry.
In Table 2, the entry rate v(0) is of the magnitude 10¡10 for the economies with upgrading.
26Table 2. Common parametrization
Economy with Economy without
upgrading investment upgrading investment
Joint Surplus Max Firm Value Max
Unemployment Rate 0.040 0.040 0.051
Unemployment Duration 0.173 0.176 0.195
Separation Rate 0.212 0.212 0.243
Upgrading/Exit Age 23.00 23.00 25.068
Wage Income Share 0.685 0.682 0.677
90-10 log-wage di¤erential 0.079 0.081 0.078
4.3 Comparative statics
We now analyze, for the baseline parametrization, the response of the three economies to
accelerations in the rate of embodied technical change, °, and in the rate of disembodied
technical change, Ã, of an empirically plausible magnitude. In our analysis we focus on the
behavior of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration, the job separation rate,
the critical age at which upgrading/exit occurs, the 90-10 log-wage inequality, and the wage
income share.
Embodied technical change – Krusell et al. (2000) and, more recently, Cummins and
Violante (2002) have argued that the annual rate of embodied technical change in the U.S.
has increased substantially in the past two decades, up to 6:5% over the years 1995-2000.23
This estimate, together with the assumption that Ã and ! remain constant, means that °
has increased to ° = 10% so as to generate a decline in the relative price of capital of 6:5%
per year.
The results of this experiment are reported in Figure 1.a. A faster rate of embodied
technical change increases the unemployment rate and wage inequality and lowers the wage
income share. The accelerated technical change shortens the useful life-time of a machine,
that is machines are either upgraded at a faster rate or they exit the economy at a faster
rate. Although wages fall, re‡ected in the declining wage income share, they do not fall
enough to compensate completely for the shortened life-time of machines. In consequence
the value of …rms declines, but in an equilibrium the value of a new machine has to equal
23Other authors, using measurement techniques di¤erent from quality-adjusted relative prices, arrived at
very similar conclusions on the pace of embodied technical change in the postwar era (see for example Hobijn
(2000)) for the United States.
27the constant (normalized) cost of a new machines. Therefore the rate at which …rms meet
workers has to increase and the measure of active …rms and employment declines.
Employment in the economy without upgrading declines somewhat more than in the
economies with upgrading because of the creative destruction e¤ect: upon …rm exit workers
enter the unemployment pool. Overall, the di¤erences across the three economies are minor
along all dimensions examined.










































Figure 1.a. Comparative Statics for Embodied Technical Change °
Disembodied technical change – Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) have pointed out
that there is a qualitative di¤erence between embodied and disembodied technical change.
Whereas a higher rate of embodied technical change tends to lower the value of existing
machines, a higher rate of disembodied technical change increases the value of machines
because it increases the output over the life time of a machine. Machines become more
valuable, therefore vacancy values increase, more machines seek to match with workers and
unemployment declines. Wage inequality declines and the wage income share increases.
From Figure 1.b we see (1) that the economies with and without upgrading essentially
28respond in the same way to a change in the rate of disembodied technical change, and (2)
that doubling the rate of disembodied technical change has a negligible quantitative e¤ect
on labor market variables.










































Figure 1.b. Comparative Statics for Disembodied Technical Change Ã
4.4 Equivalence of the replacement problems: an intuitive argu-
ment
4.4.1 Creative destruction vs. upgrading
One of the results of our calibration exercise is that the implied meeting rate for …rms
is relatively large. We use the key equilibrium conditions of the two replacement models
(creative-destruction and upgrading) to show through a limiting argument that when the
instantaneous meeting rate for …rms becomes large enough, the economy with upgrading
converges to the economy with creative destruction.24 We use the upgrading model with
24Firms meet workers at a rate ¸f = 5:9, that corresponds to an average duration of a vacancy of roughly
8 weeks. Thus in our calibration the average duration of a vacancy is of the same magnitude as the average
duration of unemployment. Hall’s (2003) work suggest that vacancies are …lled even faster; he estimates an
average vacancy duration of 4 weeks from JOLTS data (Hall 2003, Table 2 page 19).
29joint replacement decision and proceed as follows. We have to assume that I0 = Iu. We …rst
show that as ¸f ! 1 the “extra” terms that appear in the conditions (JC-j) and (JU-j) but
do not appear in the conditions (JC) and (JD) vanish. Second, we show that the expressions
for the surplus function and the distributions in the two economies converge as well.
Consider the extra term in (JC-j) and let ¸f ! 1. The expression ·V J (¹ a;¸f) converges
to 1 and S (0;¹ a;¸f) converges to zero. The latter limit is clear from simple inspection of
(47) in Appendix A.3, since both §1J (¹ a;¸f) and §2J (¹ a;¸f) converge to zero as ¸f gets large
enough. Hence, the extra term in (JC-j) converges to zero. Consider now the extra term
in (JU-j) and let ¸f ! 1. Since ·V J (a;¸f) converges to 1 for all a’s and since S (0;¹ a;¸f)
converges to zero, this term goes to zero, provided that ¸w(a;¹ a;¸f) stays …nite.
It is easy to see, from (46) in Appendix A.3 that the extra term (the second line) in
the surplus function of the economy with upgrading goes to zero as ¸f ! 1, thus the
expressions for the surplus in the two economies converge. It only remains to show that the
vacancy and employment distributions converge, but this is trivial once it is recognized that
as the meeting rate for …rms goes to in…nity, the measure of vacancies tends to zero and the
employment density is simply ¹(a)=¹ = 1=¹ a:
We conclude that when the labor market frictions are “small” from the …rm’s perspective,
the …rm becomes indi¤erent between scrapping and upgrading: for a given cost of new
machines, the upgrading option is substantially better than scrapping only if the matching
process is long and costly.
4.4.2 Hold-up vs. e¢cient upgrading
In our baseline calibration it does not really matter that much whether or not workers
share in the cost of upgrading investment. This might be surprising but a more detailed
analysis shows that in the equilibrium of the baseline economy where workers contribute to
the upgrading cost, they contribute only a very small share to the total investment cost.
Therefore switching to an economy where workers do not contribute at all to the investment
cost has minor quantitative implications.
The worker’s share in upgrading investment cost in the economy with joint surplus max-
imization is de…ned in equation (15). Using the surplus share rule (8) and the fact that the
gain from upgrading is zero at the upgrading age we get
I
W
u (¹ a) = W (0) ¡ U ¡ ¯S (¹ a).
30Now for the baseline calibration the surplus at upgrading is quite small, close to zero. Recall
the expression for the surplus value, (27)
S (¹ a) = [1 ¡ ·V J (¹ a;¸f)][S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]: (45)
In the baseline calibration the rate at which …rms …nd workers, ¸f, is quite high, vacancies
do not last very long. At least relative to the e¤ective discount rate. Therefore
·V J ¼
(1 ¡ ¯)¸f
(1 ¡ ¯)¸f + r ¡ g
¼ 1;
and the …rst term in (45) is small. For the second term in (45) we substitute (47) and we
get




+ I0 ¡ Iu
)
=f1 ¡ r + gg
¼
1
¾ + (1 ¡ ¯)¸f
+ I0 ¡ Iu:
Again for our calibration these terms are quite small, such that the product of the two terms
which de…ne the surplus value at the upgrading age is small.
Thus with joint surplus maximization the contribution of the worker to the upgrading
cost depends on the surplus of a worker in a match with a new machine, W (0)¡U. For our
baseline economy the capital value of unemployment is relatively large, and the additional
gain from being in the best possible job is not that high. Workers get a relatively large share
of the output, because they are unemployed only infrequently and if unemployed they …nd a
job relatively fast. Because the gain from being in the best possible match is not that high,
workers do not contribute that much to the upgrading cost with joint surplus maximization.
Figures 2.a and 2.b below illustrate this point. In both …gures we plot the capital values
of (un)matched …rms and workers, and the surplus capital value of a match. Figure 2.a
plots the value functions for the baseline calibration with a long life-span of machines. We
can see that the equilibrium with joint surplus maximization is in a sense better than the
equilibrium with the hold-up problem: capital values tend to be lower when the …rm alone
bears the upgrading cost. Notice that with joint surplus maximization the surplus value at
the upgrading age is quite small, although not zero, and that the surplus gain for a worker of
being in a match with the best relative to the worst available machine is quite small, about
0:2, whereas the gain for a machine is quite large, about 4. Notice also that these two gains
31add up to the cost of upgrading, about 4:2. Thus even with joint surplus maximization the
…rm bears about 95% of the cost of upgrading.
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Figure 2.a Capital values for the baseline calibration
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Figure 2.b. Capital values with longer unemployment duration
Figure 2.b plots the same value functions when we calibrate the economy such that the
equilibrium unemployment rate is the same as in the baseline economy, but the exit rate from
unemployment is much lower: the average duration of unemployment is 40 weeks, and not
328.5 weeks as in the baseline economy. This alternative calibration implies that the gain for a
worker of being with the best possible match is now 0:5, whereas the gain to a …rm is about
4. Both terms add up roughly to the total upgrading cost. We can now see a noticeable
di¤erence in the capital value functions for the two set-ups. The …rm now contributes less
to total upgrading costs, about 90%, but this is still a large part of total costs, and even
with this extreme parameterization of the labor market the steady states of the economy
with joint surplus maximization and hold-up are not that di¤erent at the same parameter
values.25
5 Conclusions
Technological progress and productivity growth, by de…nition, increase the resources avail-
able to an economy, but at the same time they can have substantial reallocative e¤ects across
di¤erent members of the economy. The labor market is an important channel through which
technological developments translate into changes in many dimensions of inequality: share of
income accruing to capital and labor owners, employment status among workers, and wage
inequality among employed workers.
The literature has pointed out that it matters qualitatively for equilibrium unemployment
(1) whether technological progress bene…ts only new matches or also ongoing relationships
and (2) how big the hold-up problem is in the technology adoption decision.
In this paper we have shown that, if one takes the view—common in modern macro-
economics—that economic models should be calibrated and tightly parameterized to repli-
cate certain key features of aggregate data, then the qualitative ambiguity of the growth-
unemployment relationship is resolved: it gives the stark answer that the various approaches
to the capital replacement problem in frictional economies all yield equivalent quantitative
results. This conclusion is reinforced once one looks not only at the unemployment rate, but
also at the equilibrium income shares and wage inequality.
The driving force behind this result is that quantitatively the labor market frictions
25Our result is reminiscent of Ljungqvist (2002) who shows the equivalence of two alternative wage bar-
gaining mechanisms in a matching environment with lay-o¤ costs. For the …rst scheme the lay-o¤ costs never
a¤ect the outside option in wage bargaining, and for the second scheme the outside option only a¤ects wage
bargaining after a match has been formed, but not when a worker and …rm meet the …rst time. Whereas
Ljungqvist (2002) can prove equivalence of the two wage bargaining mechansisms, we can only argue that
the quantitiative di¤erences between the two investment mechanisms are small.
33are very small: the average duration of a vacancy and unemployment spell is just 8 weeks—
nothing compared to the average life of capital, which is over 11 years. Consequently, upgrad-
ing gives only a very small advantage compared to innovating through creative destruction.
Moreover, the worker is not willing to contribute much to the upgrading of the old capital,
when allowed, since the alternative of unemployment is only a short transient state.
A corollary of what we just said is that in economies where frictions are more severe,
like in continental European labor markets where average unemployment duration can reach
6-8 months, our equivalence result could be weaker. Future work should be directed toward
evaluating this conjecture.
Finally, our result has useful implications with respect to a recent literature that tries to
empiricallly identify the relative importance in the U.S. economy of disembodied technical
change vis-a-vis productivity advances exploiting the di¤erent implications these shocks have
on job creation, job destruction, and the unemployment rate (see Pissarides and Vallanti
2003, and Lopez-Salido and Michelacci, 2003). In our analysis, all conclusions are based on
steady-state comparisons. In other words, our equivalence result holds in the long run, but
we have not yet studied the short-run predictions of the di¤erent models. In this sense, we
provide a cautionary remark and a suggestion: it seems that it will be extremely di¢cult
to disentangle the di¤erent sources of technical change from a low-frequency analysis of the
data, whereas a high-frequency analysis of the response of labor market ‡ows to technology
shocks might prove to be more informative.
34Appendix
A.1 Derivations of typical value functions.
The value functions of our continuous-time model can be derived as limits of a discrete time
formulation. A typical derivation of the di¤erential equations for value functions (6)-(11)
goes as follows. Consider the value of a vacant …rm with capital of age a · ¹ a at time t,
~ V (t;a). For a Poisson matching process, the probability that the vacant …rm meets a worker
over a small …nite time interval [t;t+¢] is ¢¸f. We can de…ne the vacancy value recursively
as
~ V (t;a) = ¢¸f
h
~ J(t + ¢;a + ¢) ¡ ~ V (t + ¢;a + ¢)
i
+ e
¡r¢~ V (t + ¢;a + ¢);
where the …rst term is the expected capital gain from becoming a matched …rm with value
~ J and the second term is the present value of remaining vacant at the end of the time
interval. On a balanced growth path all value functions increase at the rate g over time,
i.e., ~ V (t;a) = egtV (a) and ~ J (t;a) = egtJ (a). Subtracting ~ V (t + ¢;a) from both sides,
substituting the balanced growth path expressions for ~ V and ~ J, and dividing by ¢eg(t+¢),





= ¸f [J(a + ¢) ¡ V (a + ¢)] +
e¡r¢ ¡ 1
¢
V (a + ¢)
+
V (a + ¢) ¡ V (a)
¢
:
As we shorten the length of the time interval and take the limit for ¢ ! 0, we obtain the
di¤erential equation (10):
¡gV (a) = ¸f [J(a) ¡ V (a)] ¡ rV (a) + V
0(a):
A.2 Derivation of optimal upgrading condition.
Consider the following discretization of the investment decision when a worker-…rm pair
maximizes the joint value of the match.26 The length of a time period is ¢. At ¹ a the …rm
and worker prefer to upgrade at ¹ a rather than delaying it by one period:
W (0)+J (0)¡Iu ¸ e
¡Á¹ a¢+e
¡(r¡g)¢ f(¾¢)[V (¹ a + ¢) + U] + (1 ¡ ¾¢)[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu]g
26We consider the formulation of the problem after variables have been made stationary, that is normalized.
35The left hand side is the joint capital value after upgrading at ¹ a, and the right hand side
is the ‡ow return from production without upgrading plus the expected present value from
upgrading in the next period. Note that the match separates with probability ¾¢ and loses
the upgrading opportunity. Rearranging terms and dividing by ¢ we get
[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu]
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾¢)e¡(r¡g)¢
¢
¸ e
¡Á¹ a + ¾e
¡(r¡g)¢[V (¹ a + ¢) + U]:
Taking the limit as ¢ ! 0 yields
[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu](r ¡ g + ¾) ¸ e
¡Á¹ a + ¾ [V (¹ a) + U]:
At ¹ a ¡ ¢ the …rm and worker prefer not to upgrade, but to delay until ¹ a:
W (0)+J (0)¡Iu · e
¡Á(¹ a¡¢)¢+e
¡(r¡g)¢f(¾¢)[V (¹ a) + U] + (1 ¡ ¾¢)[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu]g
Rearranging terms and taking the limit as ¢ ! 0 we get
[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu](r ¡ g + ¾) · e
¡Á¹ a + ¾[V (¹ a) + U]
Therefore we must have that
[W (0) + J (0) ¡ Iu](r ¡ g + ¾) = e
¡Á¹ a + ¾ [V (¹ a) + U]
which is equation (24) in the main text.
A similar expression can be obtained for the upgrading problem when only the …rm bears
the cost of upgrading. At ¹ a the …rm weakly prefers to upgrade, rather than delay the decision
one more period:
J (0) ¡ Iu ¸
h
e
¡Á¹ a ¡ w(¹ a)
i
¢ + e
¡(r¡g)¢f(¾¢)V (¹ a + ¢) + (1 ¡ ¾¢)[J (0) ¡ Iu]g
Rearranging terms and taking the limit as ¢ ! 0 we get
[J (0) ¡ Iu](r ¡ g + ¾) ¸ e
¡Á¹ a ¡ w(¹ a) + ¾V (¹ a):
Analogously, the …rm prefers to delay upgrading at age ¹ a¡¢ by one period, and we get the
condition for optimal upgrading (30) in the main text:
[J (0) ¡ Iu](r ¡ g + ¾) = e
¡Á¹ a ¡ w(¹ a) + ¾V (¹ a):
36A.3 Derivation of the surplus as a function of (¸f;¹ a) in the economy with up-
grading.
In section 3.2.1 we have derived the di¤erential equation for the surplus value of a matched
…rm-worker pair in a creative-destruction economy. This equation determines the surplus
as a function of the age of the …rm’s machine and it is de…ned from the time of entry to
the time of exit, 0 · a · ¹ a. The surplus value in an economy with upgrading satis…es the
same di¤erential equation but the terminal condition for the surplus value di¤ers. In the
creative-destruction economy the …rm/machine exits at age ¹ a and the surplus at the time of
exit is zero, S (¹ a) = 0. In the economies with upgrading the machine is upgraded at age ¹ a
and the surplus is de…ned in equation (27) if the upgrading is jointly done by the …rm and
worker and in equation (34) if the …rm unilaterally makes the upgrading decision.
Joint upgrading decision– Substitute (28) for (r ¡ g)U into the di¤erential equation
for the surplus value (18), and solve that equation subject to the terminal condition (27) for
S (¹ a)











+[S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]
½





+(1 ¡ ·V (¹ a;¸f))e
¡½s(¹ a¡a)
o
with ½s = r ¡ g + ¾ + (1 ¡ ¯)¸f. This is an expression for the surplus as a function of the
two unknowns (¹ a;¸f) and S (0) Now evaluate this expression (46) at a = 0 and solve for the
surplus value of a new machine S (0). We obtain
S (0;¹ a;¸f) =



















¡½sada + [1 ¡ ·V J (¹ a;¸f)]e
¡½s¹ a:
The …rm makes the upgrading decision– Substitute (35) for (r ¡ g)U into the
di¤erential equation for the surplus value (18), and solve thatequation subject to the terminal
37condition (34) for S (¹ a)











+[(1 ¡ ¯)S (0) + I0 ¡ Iu]:::
(
1 ¡ ·V F (¹ a;¸f)
1 ¡ ¯
e







This is an expression for the surplus as a function of the two unknowns (¹ a;¸f) and S (0)
Now evaluate this expression (48) at a = 0 and solve for the surplus value of a new machine
S (0). We obtain
S (0;¹ a;¸f) =















§2F (¹ a;¸f) ´ [1 ¡ ·V F (¹ a;¸f)]e





A.4 Derivation of the steady state employment dynamics
The equations describing employment dynamics are derived as follows. Consider the measure
of matched vintage a …rms at time t. Over a short time interval of length ¢, the approximate
change in the measure is
¹(t + ¢;a) = ¹(t;a ¡ ¢)(1 ¡ ¢¾) + ¢¸fº(t;a ¡ ¢):
Subtracting ¹(t;a) from both sides and dividing by ¢ we obtain
¹(t + ¢;a) ¡ ¹(t;a)
¢
= ¡
¹(t;a) ¡ ¹(t;a ¡ ¢)
¢
¡ ¾¹(t;a ¡ ¢) + ¸fº(t;a ¡ ¢):
Taking the limit for ¢ ! 0 we obtain
¹t(t;a) = ¡¹a(t;a) ¡ ¾¹(t;a) + ¸fº(t;a):
At steady state, these measures do not change with t, and we obtain the result stated in
(37).
38In the economy with upgrading the initial measure of matched …rms with new machines
evolves according to
¹(t + ¢;0) = ¹(t;¹ a) + (¢¸f) ¢ v(t;0) +
^ a=¢ X
i=¹ a=¢
(¢¸f) ¢ v (t;ai)
Taking the limit for ¢ ! 0 we get (43)




A.5 The invariant employment and vacancy distributions as functions of (¸f;¹ a)





¡(¾+¸f)(a¡~ a)d~ a + ¹(0)e
¡(¾+¸f)a: (50)
Evaluating this measure at ¹ a we have







We solve the di¤erential equation (44) for vacancies on the interval [¹ a;^ a] backwards and get
v(a) = e
¡¸f(a¡¹ a)v(¹ a): (52)
The total measure of vacancies on [¹ a;^ a] is then
Z ^ a
¹ a
v(a)da = v (¹ a)A2 (53)
A2 ´




This is enough for the creative-destruction economy since we can use the initial condition
¹(0) = 0.
In the economy with upgrading we have to solve for the employment density of new
machines. This density satis…es (43) into which we substitute (52) and (51),
¹(0) = ¹(¹ a) + ¸fA2v(¹ a)
= ¹(¹ a) + ¸fA2[¹(0) + v(0) ¡ ¹(¹ a)]
= [1 ¡ ¸fA2]
·
f¹(0) + v(0)g¸fA1 + ¹(0)e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
¸
+¸fA2[¹(0) + v (0)]
39We can solve this expression for the density of new employed machines as a function of new
vacant machines
¹(0) = Bv(0) (54)
B =
(1 ¡ ¸fA2)¸fA1 + ¸fA2






Note that B can be simpli…ed to
B =















For the calibration of our economy B is very large since the denominator is close to zero.
This will be important when we obtain numerical solutions of the steady state.
Substituting (54) and (43) into the expression for the density of employed machines at
the upgrade age ¹ a (51) yields ¹(¹ a) = v(0)(1 + B)¸fA1 + Bv(0)e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a or
¹(¹ a) = C1v(0) (55)
C1 = (1 + B)¸fA1 + Be
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
Evaluating (43) at ¹ a and solving for v(¹ a) we have v(¹ a) = ¹(0) + v(0) ¡ ¹(¹ a). After we
substitute (55) for ¹(¹ a) and (54) for ¹(0) we have
v(¹ a) = C2v (0) (56)
C2 ´ (1 + B)(1 ¡ ¸fA1) ¡ Be
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a:
















Using (43) for m(0), and substituting (54) for ¹(0) yields
Z ¹ a
0
¹(a)da = C3v (0) with (57)
















40and using equations (54) and (57) we get
Z ¹ a
0
v(a)da = C4v (0) (58)
C4 = (1 + B)[¹ a ¡ (¹ a ¡ A3)¸f=(¾ + ¸f)] ¡ BA3
Combining equations (53), (56), and (58) yields total vacancies as
Z ^ a
0
v (a)da = C5v(0) (59)






To get the density of new …rms coming into the economy with new machines we use the















For the calibration of the economy entry v (0) is essentially. Note that both C3 and C5
are linear in B, and since B is large entry is essentially zero. A good approximation of the
employment and vacancy densities is then obtained by multiplying v(0) with B and dividing
all densities with B.
~ v(0) = Bv(0) = µ=
h
µ ~ C3 + ~ C5
i











~ C4 = (1 + 1=B)¸f (¹ a ¡ A3)=(¾ + ¸f) + A3
¼ ¸f (¹ a ¡ A3)=(¾ + ¸f) + A3
~ C3 = (1 + 1=B)¸f (¹ a ¡ A3)=(¾ + ¸f) + A3
¼ ¸f (¹ a ¡ A3)=(¾ + ¸f) + A3
~ C2 = (1 + 1=B)(1 ¡ ¸fA1) ¡ e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
¼ (1 ¡ ¸fA1) ¡ e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
41~ C1 = (1 + 1=B)¸fA1 + e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
¼ ¸fA1 + e
¡(¾+¸f)¹ a
¹(0) = ~ v(0), ¹(¹ a) = ~ C1~ v(0), v(¹ a) = ~ C2~ v(0),
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